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FOURTH AMENDMENT-NONEXIGENT HOME ARREST ENTRIES
Payton v. New York, 100 S. Ct. 1371 (1980).
The question posed but left unsettled by the
United States Supreme Court in Coolidge v. New
Hampshire,' "whether and under what circumstances an officer may enter a suspect's home to
make a warrantless arrest,"2 has been resolved. In
a six-to-three decision, the Court in Payton v. New
York 3 held that the fourth amendment 4 prohibits
police from making a warrantless and nonconsensual entry into a suspect's home in order to make
a routine felony arrest.
STATEMENT OF FACTS

Defendant Theodore Payton was convicted of
murder by ajury in the Supreme Court, New York
County. Defendant Obie Riddick, by his plea of
guilty to criminal possession of a controlled substance, was convicted before the Supreme Court,
Queens County. The defendants' convictions were
affirmed, 5 and their appeals were consolidated. On
appeal, each defendant claimed that evidence critical to conviction should have been suppressed
because it was seized after an entry into the defendant's home with neither the authority of a
warrant nor that conferred by exigent circum6
stances in violation of the fourth amendment.
PAYTON

On January 12, 1970, a service station manager
was murdered during an armed robbery by a man
carrying a rifle and wearing a ski mask who fled
1403 U.S. 443 (1971).
2Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 113 n.13 (1975).
3 100 S. Ct. 1371 (1980).
'The fourth amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The fourth amendment is made
applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
s People v. Payton, 55 A.D.2d 858, 390 N.Y.S.2d 768
(1976) (memorandum decision). People v. Riddick, 56
A.D.2d 937, 392 N.Y.S.2d 848 (1976).
6People v. Payton, 45 N.Y.2d 300, 308, 380 N.E.2d
224, 227, 408 N.Y.S.2d 395, 398 (1978).

the scene with the weapon and cash. On January
14, 1970, two eyewitnesses to the crime identified
Payton as the killer. On January 15, 1970, at
approximately 7:30 a.m., four detectives and a
police sergeant went to Payton's apartment without first having secured a warrant. The officers
observed a light shining from beneath the door of
Payton's apartment and heard a radio playing
within. The officers knocked at the door but received no response. With the aid of crowbars, the
police forced open the door of the apartment. The
defendant was not in the apartment. The officers
confiscated a .30 caliber shell casing which was in
plain view on top of a stereo set. On January 16,
1970, Payton surrendered himself to the police.
In a pretrial suppression hearing, the court did
not exclude the shell casing from evidence, holding
that the casing had been inadvertently observed
while the police were lawfully on the premises to
make a warrantless arrest for a felony which they
had reasonable grounds to believe the defendant
had committed.7 The Appellate Division affirmed
8
the defendant's conviction for felony murder.
RIDDICK

On March 14, 1974, defendant Riddick was
arrested in his home for the commission of two
armed robberies in 1971. InJune, 1973, the robbery
victims identified Riddick from a photograph. In
January, 1974, the detective investigating the robberies discovered Riddick's address. At noon on
March 14, 1974, he and two other detectives went
to Riddick's house without first having procured
an arrest warrant. The officers knocked on the door
and were admitted into the house by the defendant's three-year-old son. Riddick was sitting in a
bed. He acknowledged his identity and was told
that he was under arrest, advised of his rights, and
instructed to get out of bed. When it then became
7Id.
at 306, 380 N.E.2d at 226, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 397
n.l. As the court noted, under the code of criminal
procedure that was in effect at the time of entry, a peace
officer could make a warrantless arrest "when a felony
has in fact been committed, and he has reasonable cause
for believing the person to be arrested to have committed
it." N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. LAW § 177 (McKinney).
s 55 A.D.2d at 858, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 768.
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apparent that the defendant would have to dress,
the detective searched the bed, a chest of drawers,
and Riddick's clothing. He found a quantity of
narcotics and a hypodermic syringe in the top
drawer of the chest.
After indictment, Riddick moved to suppress the
drugs and syringe on the grounds that the arrest
was unlawful because it was made without a warrant and without announcement by police of their
purpose before entering his home, which motion
was denied?9 The suppression court held that the
arrest was lawful because it was based on probable
cause and the search conducted incidental to the
arrest was reasonable. Riddick pleaded guilty to a
reduced charge; the10conviction was affirmed by the
Appellate Division.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In a four-to-three decision, the Court of Appeals
of New York concluded that the entries made by
the police in both cases did not violate the defendants' constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and seizures." The majority opinion
written by Judge Jones offered only a truncated
analysis resting not on precedent but,
on what we perceive to be a substantial difference
between the intrusion which attends an entry for
the purpose of searching the premises and that
which results from an entry for the purpose of
making an arrest, and on the significant difference
in the governmental interest inachieving the objective of the intrusion in the two circumstances. 1 '

According to the majority, a search is a more
extensive incursion on the householder's privacy,
and it must therefore be limited by a warrant.
Recognizing that while a seizure of the householder
is "unquestionably of grave import," the court
reasoned that "there is no accompanying prying
into the area of expected privacy attending his
possessions and affairs."' 3 The court cited United
States v. Watson'" for establishing that personal sei956 A.D.2d at 937, 392 N.Y.S.2d at 848. The law in
effect at that time provided that with respect to arrest
without a warrant "in order to effect such an arrest, a
police officer may enter premises in which he reasonably
believes such person to be present." N.Y. CRIM. PRoc.
LAW § 140.15 (McKinney).
056 A.D.2d at 937, 392 N.Y.S.2d at 848.
" 45 N.Y.2d at 312, 380 N.E.2d at 230, 408 N.Y.S.2d
at 401.
12Id. at 310, 380 N.E.2d at 228-29, 408 N.Y.S.2d at
400.
'3 Id., 380 N.E.2d at 229, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 400.
14 423 U.S. 411 (1976).

zure alone does not require a warrant, and concluded that there was a reason to distinguish between an arrest
in a public place and an arrest in
5
a residence.'
Further, the court balanced the defendants' right
to privacy with the governmental objective of the
arrest of one reasonably believed to have committed a felony. To support its conclusion that the
entries in the defendants' homes to make the arrests
were not unreasonable under the fourth amendment test, the court reasoned that "[t]he community's interest in the apprehension of criminal suspects is of a higher order than its concern
for the
6
recovery of contraband or evidence."'
Finally, the court noted that English common
law recognized warrantless entries to make felony
arrests,' 7 and that New York state had provided
statutory authority for such entries since 1881.18 In
addition, thirty other states have enacted statutes
authorizing warrantless entries of buildings (without exception for homes) for purposes of arrest. 19
The court also relied on the ALI Model Code of
Pre-Arraignment Procedure, which recommends
that an officer who is empowered to make an arrest,
and has probable cause to believe that the person
to be arrested is on private premises, be authorized
to demand entry to such premises and thereupon
to make an arrest.20
Three 'dissents were filed in the case. All concluded that the police need a warrant to enter a
home in order to arrest a person unless there are
exigent circumstances. Two of the dissenters,
Judges Wachtler and Fuchsberg, concurred with
the reasoning of the third,2 ' Judge Cooke, who
spoke for all three dissenters.
Cooke relied heavily on Justice Stewart's plurality opinion in Coolidge v. New Hampshire22 for his
assertion that a warrantless arrest in the home is
per se unreasonable in the absence of exigent circumstances. According to Cooke, "[r]easoning that
15 45 N.Y.2d at 310, 380 N.E.2d at 229, 408 N.Y.S.2d
at 400.
16Id. at 311, 380 N.E.2d at 229, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 400.
1' Id. (citing only Hale and Chitty who each promoted
the proposition that at common law the constable could
enter a house to effect a warrantless felony arrest, provid-

ing he had probable cause).
8 Id. See N.Y. GRIM. PRO. LAW §§ 177-78 (McKinney).
1945 N.Y.2d at 312, 380 N.E.2d at 230, 408 N.Y.S.2d
at 401 (citing ALI MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT

PROC. (1975)).
0

2 ALI

MODEL CODE

§ 120.6(l) (1975).

OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT

2' These dissents concern extraneous issues.

"2403 U.S. 443 (1970).

PROC.

SUPREME COURT REVIEW

[Vol. 71

of a warrantless peaceable entry into the home of
a suspect whom police had probable cause to believe was an armed felon, the District of Columbia
Circuit structured the rationale later embraced by
the majority of the circuits which have faced the
issue of warrantless home entries. The Dorman court
held that warrantless entry of a dwelling was per
se unreasonable absent certain exigent circumstances which would justify the police bypassing
"24 the magistrate. The court elucidated a number of
quantum of protection than his very person ....
Relying on cases which concerned searches, considerations that are material in determining
Judge Cooke concluded that since the purpose of whether entry is reasonable under the circumthe fourth amendment is to guard against arbitrary stances: (1) a grave offense is involved; (2) the
governmental invasions of the home, "the neccess- suspect is believed to be armed; (3) a clear showing
ity of prior judicial approval should control any of probable cause to believe the suspect committed
contemplated entry, regardless of the purpose for the crime involved; (4) strong reason to believe
that the suspect is in the premises; (5) the suspect
which that entry is sought. 25 Judge Cooke focused
on the sanctity of a private home 26 and noted that is likely to escape; (6) peaceable entry; (7) the time
the warrant requirement minimizes "nonconsen- of entry.'
The Dorman decision placed search and arrest on
sual entry into the home by overzealous police
officers who may occasionally lose sight of the the same constituiional footing and listed considerations material to the finding of exigent circumcitizen's expectation of privacy." 27 Accordingly,
Judge Cook would reverse the decision of the ma- stances. According to the Dorman court the warrant
requirement rests on the concept that a judicial
jority.
officer, and not the prosecutor or police, should
THE CIRCUIT COURT DECISIONS
determine whether an entry to search or arrest
The state court's rationale conflicts with the should be made.32 Subject to the exception for
circuit court opinions which have dealt with the exigent circumstances, the Constitution prohibits
issue of non-exigent home arrest entries. As Justice invasion of the home by unconsented entry unless
Stevens noted in the majority opinion in Payton v. need is established by a warrant.33
New York, five of the seven United States Courts of
The two elements of the Dorman rationale, the
Appeals that have considered the question have rejection of the bifurcated standard and the per se
expressed the opinion that such arrests are uncon- unreasonableness of warrantless entries (qualified
stitutional. 28 The reasoning of each of these five only by the existence of exigent circumstances), are
circuits is similar in that each has explicitly or the hallmark of the other four circuit opinions
implicitly rejected the bifurcated standard between which have held warrantless entries to be uncona search and an arrest. A statement which was stitutional. The Sixth Circuit adopted this rationmere dicta in Coolidge, that "searches and seizures ale in United States v. Killebrew,34 when it faced the
inside a man's house without a warrant are per se issue of the lawfulness of a warrantless entry and
unreasonable in the absence of some one of a search of a suspected felon's motel room by the
number of well defined 'exigent circumstances,' "29 police. The entry in question was held unlawful
is the doctrine of these five circuits.
because no exigent circumstances existed which
the intrusion which attends entry into the home to
effect a warrantless arrest is somehow less egregious
than entry to conduct a search, the majority simply
reads the warrant requirement out of the Fourth
Amendment."2 Cooke rejected the premise of the
majority's opinion that searches and seizures are to
be treated differently. "The bifurcated standard
between search and arrest announced today accords an individual's bare possessions a greater

°
Dorman v. United Statess is the most significant of

the circuit court opinions. In deciding the propriety
N.Y.2d at 321, 380 N.E.2d at 236, 408 N.Y.S.2d
at 406 (Cooke, J., dissenting).
3345

Id. at 320, 380 N.E.2d at 235, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 406.
at 321, 380 N.E.2d at 235, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 407.
2 Id. at 323, 380 N.E.2d at 237, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 408.
27Id. at 323-24, 380 N.E.2d at 327, 408 N.Y.S.2d at
408.
2 100 S. Ct. at 1374 (footnote omitted).
29403 U.S. at 477-80.
U

25 Id.

F.2d 385 (D.C. Cir. 1970). The case involved a
nighttime warrantless entry by police into the home of
30435

an armed robbery suspect some few hours after the crime
was committed and after they had received an eyewitness
identification of the suspect. The Assistant State's Attorney had been unable to locate a magistrate for the
issuance of an appropriate warrant.
31Id. at 392-93.
32 Id. at 389. See also Accarino v. United States, 179
F.2d 456, 458 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
33435 F.2d at 391.

-4 560 F.2d 729 (6th Cir. 1977). The same court had
previously embraced the Doman rationale in United
3tates v. Shye, 492 F.2d 886 (6th Cir. 1977).
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35

would excuse the absence of the warrant.

Simi-

larly, the Eighth Circuit relied on the exigent
circumstances doctrine in United States v. Houle36 to
conclude that a warrantless search and seizure
conducted on private premises violated the fourth
amendment.
37
The Ninth Circuit, in United States v. Prescott,
also accepted the exigent circumstances doctrine.
Prescott concerned a forcible entry made to arrest a
suspect whom federal agents had probable cause
to believe committed a felony. The court remanded
the case for determination of the existence of exigent circumstances, without which the warrantless
arrest would be unreasonable. In deciding that a
warrant is required absent exigent circumstances,
the court expressly refused to distinguish between
a search and an arrest: "The sanctity of the home
is no less threatened when the object of police entry

an arrest in the home is too substantial an invasion
to allow without a warrant even if it was accomplished under statutory authority and with probable cause.42 Significantly, Justice Stevens cited
Dorman and Reed in his majority opinion in Payton
as persuasive and in accord with the Court's fourth
amendment decisions.43
Three other circuits have assumed without deciding that warrantless home arrests are unconstitutional. In United States v. Bradley," the First Circuit relied on Dorman in finding exigent circumstances to uphold the arrest of the defendants in
their apartment by federal undercover narcotics
agents.45 The Third Circuit, embracing Dorman,
found exigent circumstances to uphold a warrantless arrest of a suspected drug dealer in her apartment by agents of the Bureau of Narcotics and
Dangerous Drugs in United States v. Davis.46 The

court relied on the Coolidge dicta that warrantless
arrests in the home are per se unreasonable. 47 Similarly, in Vance v. North Carolina,4" the Fourth Circuit
embraced the Dorman doctrine, and upheld an
home by
arrest of a suspected armed robber in his
49
police officers with an invalid warrant.
The two circuit courts which have upheld warrantless arrests made in the home relied on statutes.
The Fifth Circuit, in United States v. Williams,5°
upheld the nighttime warrantless arrest of a suspected kidnapper by F.B.I. agents on the grounds
that 18 U.S.C. § 3053 empowers F.B.I. agents to
42 572 F.2d at 423.
43 100 S. Ct. at 1380-81.
44455 F.2d 1181 (1972).
45
Id.at 1187.
46461 F.2d 1026, 1031 (3d Cir. 1972). The case concerned a forcible entry into a felony suspect's apartment.
The agents in question had received a telephone call
35 The defendant in Killebrew was suspected of possessfrom a reliable informant stating that the suspect had
ing an unregistered firearm. The police had followed the gone to pick up a shipment of heroin and would return
defendant into his hotel room after questioning him in that evening. A second call from the same informant (one
the hallway. The court pointed out that the suspect was hour after the first) revealed that the suspect had returned
not known to be dangerous and no grave dffense or crime and was at the apartment "cutting" the heroin. The
of violence was threatened or indicated. Nor could the agents proceeded without a warrant as the nearest U.S.
entry be justified on the ground that the suspect might Commissioner was approximately 45 minutes away, and
have escaped during the time necessary to obtain a the agents knew that it took only 15 minutes to cut an
warrant. 560 F.2d at 734.
ounce
47 of heroin.
Id. at 1030.
-6 603 F.2d 1297 (8th Cir. 1979).
37581 F.2d 1343 (9th Cir. 1978).
48
49 432 F.2d 984 (4th Cir. 1970).
ssd. at 1349-50.
Id. at 990-91. The warrant in question had been
39 572 F.2d 412 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 913
signed by a desk officer on the police force and was
therefore invalid. However, the court concluded that the
(1978).
40
Id. at 418 (emphasis added).
defendant's arrest passed the exigent circumstances test.
4' 21 U.S.C. § 801 (1976). Under the statute an agent
First, an armed robbery is a grave offense. Second, the
may: "Make arrests without warrant for any offense police had probable cause. Third, the police had reasonagainst the United States committed in his presence or able cause to believe that the defendant was armed.
for any felony cognizable under the laws of the United Fourth, the defendant was likely to escape. Fifth, the
States, if he has probable cause to believe that the person entry was peaceable.
50 573 F.2d 348 (5th Cir. 1978).
to be arrested has committed or is committing a felony."
is the seizure of a person than a thing ....

The

distinction between a search warrant and an arrest
warrant is an artificial one.' 'The Fourth Amendment makes no distinction."
The Second Circuit took the Dorman rationale
one step further in United States v. Reed.ss The
Second Circuit declared that "warrantless felony
arrests by federal agents effected in the suspect's
home, in the absence of exigent circumstances, even
when basedupon statutory authorityand probable cause,
are unconstitutional."40 Reed concerned the warrantless entry by U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration agents into the home of a suspected felon.
Under the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention
and Control Act of 1970, D.E.A. agents are empowered to make warrantless arrests if they have
probable cause.41 According to the court in Reed,
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make warrantless felony arrests if they have reasonable grounds to believe that the person to be
arrested has committed such a felony.51 In United
States ex rel. Wright v. Woods,s2 the issue was whether,
consistent with the fourth amendment, police without a search or arrest warrant may forcibly enter
an apartment being used solely for gambling in
order to make arrests for a gambling offense. In
upholding the warrantless entry and subsequent
arrests, the court declared that "the Constitution
has never . . . been read absolutely to require a
search or arrest warrant as a precondition to entry
into private buildings.' ' 3 Finally, the Tenth Circuit, in Michael v. United States,54 upheld a warrantless arrest in the home without discussing the constitutional issue, relying entirely on statutory
grounds.ss
THE SUPREME COURT DECISION
THE MAJORITY OPINION

Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, prefaced the opinion with a detailed statement of facts
and a clarification of the issue.5 Stevens noted that
the case presented neither an arrest justified by
exigent circumstances nor an entry into a third
party's home to make an arrest.5 7 In both the Payton
and Riddick cases, the police, having probable
cause, made a nonconsensual, warrantless entry
into the residence of the suspect in order to make
a routine felony arrest.5
The second portion of the opinion focused on
the language of the fourth amendment. According
to the Court, the plain language of the amendment
condemns all unreasonable searches or seizures
without a warrant.5 9 The Court noted: "The simple
language of the Amendment applies equally to
seizures of persons and to seizures of property. Our
5' Id. at 350.
52 432 F.2d 1143 (7th Cir. 1970).
3Id. at 1146.
5 393 F.2d 22 (10th Cir. 1968). Michael was decided
prior to either Dorman or Coolidge.
Id. at 32-33. 18 U.S.C. § 3052 (1976).
5 100 S. Ct. at 1375-78. The issue addressed by the
Court was whether an officer may enter a suspect's home
to make a warrantless arrest.
7 Id. at 1378. "Accordingly, we have no occasion to
consider the sort of emergency or dangerous situation,
described in our cases as 'exigent circumstances,' that
would justify a warrantless entry into a home for the
purpose of either arrest or search."
Id. at 1375.
5 Id. at 1379. The Court, however, does not elucidate
the factors which cause a search and/or seizure to be
unreasonable. Query whether a lack of a warrant is
dispositive on the issue of reasonableness?
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analysis in this case may therefore properly commence with rules that have been well established
in Fourth Amendment litigation involving tangible
items."'
The Court concluded that warrantless
searches and seizures within a home are presumed
unreasonable,6 1 and approved the treatment of the
issue in Dornan v. United States62 and United States v.
Reed. 63 The Dorman court concluded that an entry
to make an arrest implicates the same interest in
preserving the privacy of the home as does an entry
to search and, therefore, the same level of constitutional protection is justified.6 The Supreme
Court found this reasoning persuasive and in accord with the Court's fourth amendment decisions.
Further, the Court noted that any differences in
the intrusiveness of the two types of entry were
merely ones of degree rather than kind.65 Finally,
the Court stated: "In terms that apply equally to
seizures of property and to seizures of persons, the
Fourth Amendment has drawn a firm line at the
entrance to the house. Absent exigent circumstances, that threshold may not reasonably be
crossed without a warrant."
The third portion of the opinion was devoted to
harmonizing the holding of Watson, which upheld
67
a warrantless arrest in a public place, with the
present decision that a warrantless arrest in the
home is a violation of the fourth amendment absent exigent circumstances. Stevens attributed the
difference in the decisions to three factors: (1) the
tenor of the common law; (2) the treatment of the
issues by the state legislatures; (3) congressional
judgment.68
Stevens explained that in Watson, "the Court
relied on the well-settled common-law rule that a
warrantless arrest in a public place is valid if the
arresting officer had probable cause to believe the
suspect is a felon."6 As Stevens accurately pointed
out, the common law rule on warrantless home
arrests was not as clear as the rule on arrests in
6 Id. The Court fails to note that in its past decisions
the rules applicable to searches differ from those applicable to seizures. Compare United States v. Watson, 423
U.S. 411,423-24 (1975) with Jones v. United States, 357
U.S. 493, 497 (1958).
61 00 S. Ct. at 1380.
62 435 F.2d 385 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
63572 F.2d 412.
64 100 S. Ct. at 1380-81 (citing Dorman v. United

States, 435 F.2d 385). See text accompanying notes 30-33
supra.
6 100 S. Ct. at 1381.
6Id. at 1382.
67 423 U.S. at 416.
68 100 S. Ct. at 1382.
69 Id. (footnote omitted).

1980]
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public places. Rather, an examination of common
law commentaries reveals that there has been no
70
definitive rule on the subject. Five commentators
who considered the question concluded that warrantless entry into the home to make a felony arrest
71
was legal. Lord Coke, on the other hand, clearly
viewed a warrantless entry for the purpose of arrest
72
to be illegal. The remaining common law commentators, while not free from ambiguity, suggest
that a warrant was required to effect a valid home
73
From his analysis of the common law
arrest.
Stevens concluded that the Court lacked the guid74
ance that was present in Watson.
Second, Stevens noted that a majority of states
permit warrantless entry into the home to arrest
70

This is the consensus of the modem commentators
who have carefully studied the early works. Note, The
Constitutionalityof Warrantless Home Arrests, 78 COLuM. L.
REV. 1550, 1551-53 (1978). See also ALI MODEL CODE OF
PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROc. 308 (Proposed Official Draft
1975); Blakey, The Rule of Announcement and Unlawful Entry:
Miller v. United States, and Ker v. California, 112 U. PA. L.
REV. 499, 502 (1964); Comment, Forcible Entry to Effect a
Warrantless Arrest-The Eroding Protection of the Castle, 82
DICK. L. REV. 167, 168 n.5 (1977); Recent Development,
Warrantless Arrests by Police Survives a Constitutional Challenge-UnitedStates v. Watson, 14 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 193,
210-11 (1976).
714 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *292; 1J. CHITTy,
CRIMINAL LAW 23 (1816); M. DALTON, THE CoUNTRY
JUSTIcE

186-87 (2d ed. 1619); 1 M.

HALE, THE HISTORY

OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 588-89 (1736); 4 H. STEPHEN, NEW COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 359

(1845).
72 4 E. COKE, INsTiTTES * 177-78. "[N]elither the constable, nor any other can break open any house for the
apprehension of the party suspected or charged with the
felony...."
73 1 R. BuRN, THE JUSTIcE OF THE PEACE AND PARISH
OFFICER 87 (6th ed. 1758) ("where one lies under probable suspicion only, and is not indicted, it seems the better
opinion ... that no one can justify the breaking open
doors in order to apprehend him .... "); 1 E. EAST, PLEAS
OF THE CROWN 321-22 (1806) ("yet a bare suspicion of
guilt against the party will not warrant proceeding to
this extremity [the breaking of doors], unless the officer
be armed with a magistrate's warrant. ... "); 2 W.
HAWKINS, PLEAS OF THE CROWN

139 (6th ed. 1787) ("but

where one lies under probable suspicion only, and is not
indicted, it seems to better opinion ... that no one can
justify the breaking open doors in order to apprehend
him."); I W. RUSSELL, TREATISE ON CRIMES AND MISDEMEANOES 745 (1819) (rule similar to that of East).
74 100 S. Ct. at 1386.
Whereas the rule concerning the validity of an
arrest in a public place was supported by cases
directly in point and by the unanimous views of the
commentators, we have found no direct authority
supporting forcible entries into a home to make a
routine arrest and the weight of the scholarly opinion is somewhat to the contrary.

even in the absence of exigent circumstances.
Twenty-three states authorize such entries by stat75
utes; one state has authorized warrantless arrest
76
entries by judicial decision; fifteen states prohibit
77
such entries; and eleven states have taken no
78
position on the question. However, Stevens contended that these figures reflect a significant decline during the last decade in the number of states
permitting warrantless arrests. According to Stevens, virtually all the state courts confronting the
constitutional issue directly have held such entries
to be invalid absent exigent circumstances. Therefore, Stevens concluded that there was not the
virtual unanimity among the states on this question
that was present in Watson with regard to warrant7
less arrests in public places. Finally, Stevens asserted that there had been no congressional determination that warrantless entries into the home are
reasonable. Thus, the legislative sanction in Watson
had no counterpart in Payton.8
75
Id. See ALA. CODE § 15-10-4 (1977); ALASKA STAT. §
12.25.100 (1972); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 43-414 (1977); FLA.
STAT. § 909.19 (1973); HAW. REV. STAT. § 38-803-11

(Supp. 1975);

IDAHO CODE

§

§ 19-611 (1948);

ILL. REV.

107-5(d) (1970); .A. CODE CRIM. PRO.
ANN. 224 (West 1967); MICH. COMp. LAWS § 764.21
(1968); MINN. STAT. § 544.200 (1953); NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 29-411 (1974); NEv. REV. STAT. § 171.138 (1977); N.Y.
CRIM. PROC. LAW §§ 140.15(4), 120.80(4)-(5) (McKinney
1971); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 40-807 (1955); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 77-13-12 (1953); WASH. REV. CODE § 10.31.040
(1961).
76
See Shanks v. Commonwealth, 463 S.W.2d 312,
315 (Ky. 1971).
77 Four states prohibit such entries by statute, see GA.
CODE §§ 27-205, 27-207 (1978); IND. CODE §§ 35-1-19-4,
35-2-29-6 (1979); MoNT. REV. CODES ANN. § 46-6-401
(1979); S.C. CODE § 23-15-60 (1977). Texas prohibits
such entries by common law, see United States v. Hall,
468 F. Supp. 123, 131 n.16 (D. Tex. 1979); Moore v.
State, 149 Tex. Crim. 229, 193 S.W.2d 204, 207 (1946).
Ten other states, Arizona, California, Colorado, Iowa,
Kansas, Massachusetts, Oregon, Pennsylvania, West Virginia, and Wisconsin, prohibit such entries on constitutional grounds.
78
Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Maryland, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, Rhode Island,
Vermont, Virginia, and Wyoming.
79 100 S. Ct. at 1387.
80 There are federal statutes which in general terms
authorize certain government agents to make warrantless
arrests. See 21 U.S.C. § 878 (1976) (D.E.A. agents); 18
U.S.C. § 3052 (1976) (Secret Service Agents); 18 U.S.C.
§ 3061 (1976) (Postal Sevice Inspectors); 26 U.S.C.
§ 7607 (1976) (customs officers). The language of these
statutes is similar, see, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3052 (1976):
[Agents have authority to] make arrests without
warrant for any offense against the United States
committed in their presence, or for any felony cognizable under the laws of the United States if they
STAT.'ch738,
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In the fourth and final portion of the majority
opinion, Stevens rejected the arguments that the
warrant requirement will pressure police to seek
warrants and make arrests too hurriedly, thus increasing the likelihood of arresting innocent people;
that it will divert scarce resources thereby interfering with the ability of the police to conduct thorough investigations; that it will penalize the police
for deliberate planning; and that it will lead to
s
more injuries.8 Stevens rejected the suggestion of
the State of New York that a search warrant based
upon probable cause to believe that the suspect is
at home can adequately protect the privacy interests at stake. New York argued that an arrest
warrant requirement was manifestly impractical.
Stevens responded to that contention by noting
that although an arrest warrant requirement may
afford less protection than a search warrant requirement, "it will suffice to interpose the magistrate's determination of probable cause between
82
the zealous officer and the citizen." Thus, because
no arrest warrant was obtained in either the Payton
or Riddick case, the state court judgments were
reversed.
JUSTICE WHITE'S DISSENT

Justice White, in his dissent in which the Chief
Justice and Justice Rehnquist joined, rejected the
' ' 83
adopted by the majority
"hard-and-fast rule
that officers may never enter a home during the
daytime to arrest for a dangerous felony absent
exigent circumstances unless they have first obtained a warrant. Rather, White would substitute
"a clear and simple rule": "After knocking and
announcing their presence, police may enter the
home to make a daytime arrest without a warrant
when there is probable cause to believe that the
person to be arrested committed a felony and is
' ' 84
According to White, this
present in the house.
rule would best comport with the common law
background, the traditional practice in the states,
and the history and policies of the fourth amendment, unlike the rule formulated by the majority
in a decision which "virtually ignores these centuries of common-law development, and distorts the
have reasonable grounds to believe that the person
to be arrested has committed or is committing such
felony.
It is unclear whether these statutes are applicable in
the context of a warrantless home arrest.
"i
8 2 100 S. Ct. at 1388.

Id.

MId. at 1397 (White, J., dissenting).
84Id
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historical meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 5
White rejected Stevens' interpretation of the
common law. First, White noted that there are two
maxims that seem inconsistent: "Every man's
house is his castle" and "The King's keys unlock
all doors." The first of these applies to civil process,
and the second to criminal process.H Although the
Crown had power to enter a dwelling in criminal
cases, the cases do not directly address the question
of whether a constable could break doors to arrest
87
without authorization by a warrant.
White concurred with the majority that commentators have differed as to the scope of the
constable's inherent authority, when not acting
under a warrant, to break doors in order to arrest.
Relying principally on Blackstone, White then concluded that probably the majority of the commentators would permit arrest entries on probable
suspicion even if the person arrested were not in
fact guilty. These authors, according to White,
would have permitted the type of home arrest
in Payton due to the existence
entries that occurred
88
of probable cause.
According to White, not only did the majority
opinion misinterpret the common law, but it misinterpreted the history of the fourth amendment as
well. The fourth amendment, in White's opinion,
was not intended to outlaw the type of police
conduct at issue. Rather, the fourth amendment
was directed towards safeguarding the rights at
common law and restricting the warrant practice
which gave officers vast new powers beyond their
inherent authority. The inherent authority of the
officers at common law included, according to
White, relying principally on Blackstone, the power
to break down doors in making warrantless felony
89
arrests.
White supported his attack on the majority opinion with evidence that by 1931, twenty-four of
twenty-nine state codes authorized warrantless ar85Id.

8 Wilgus, Arrest Without a Warrant, 22 MicH. L. Rev.
798, 800 (1924).
An early dictum in the year book says: "For a
felony, or suspicion of felony, one may break into
the dwelling house to take the felon for it is the
common weal and to the interest of the King to take
him; but it is otherwise as to debt or trespass; the
sheriff or any other may not break into his dwelling
to take him, for it is only for the private interest of
the party."
87
Id. (citing Y.B. 13 Edw. 4, f. 9a (1455)) (White, J.,
dissenting). The only relevant cases concern execution of
the88king's writ.
id.
8
1d. at 1392.
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ANALYSIS
rest entries, and by 1975, thirty-one of thirty-seven
state codes authorized warrantless home felony
The Court in Payton v.New York held that wararrests.s0 White believed that the consensus among rantless entries into the home for purposes of arrest
the states was entitled to more deference than the are per se unreasonable absent exigent circummajority opinion provided. The federal statutes stances. Thus the Court placed searches and arrests
dealing with powers of warrantless arrest are also on the same constitutional footing. The Payton derelevant. 9' Focusing on 18 U.S.C. § 3052 (1976), cision has critical implications for the reach of the
White remarked: "Particularly in light of the ac- fourth amendment. First, the Court necessarily
cepted rule at common law and among the States rejected the illogical bifurcated treatment of arrests
permitting warrantless home arrests, the absence of and searches which it had developed in earlier
any explicit exception for the home from § 3052 is fourth amendment decisions. Second, by embracpersuasive evidence that Congress intended to au- ing the Dorman rationale that warrantless arrest
thorize warrantless arrests there as well as else- entries are per se unreasonable absent exigent cirwhere."' ' 2 In White's opinion, the federal statutes cumstances, the Court provided a workable stancan be read to authorize the type of police conduct dard for thejudiciary and law enforcement officials
at issue. The majority opinion found no guidance to determine when a warrant is necessary.
in the statutes.
In rejecting the differential treatment of searches
White devoted the second portion of his dissent
and seizures in fourth amendment analysis, the
to developing the rule which he would implement. Court resolved an issue which had troubled it since
He called for a realistic assessment of the extent of its decision in Coolidge v. New Hampshire.9 7 The
the invasion of privacy. The inquiry must be plurality opinion in Coolidge offered as dicta the
"whether the incremental intrusiveness that results
assertion that warrantless searches and arrests are
from an arrest's being made in the dwelling is enough per se unreasonable absent exigent circumstances. 9
to support an inflexible constitutional rule requir- This statement, however, conflicted with the
ing warrants for such arrests whenever exigent Court's previous decisions on the reasonableness of
circumstances are not present., 93 White's rule has warrantless searches and arrests.
four restrictions-felony, knock and announce,
The Court's position on warrantless searches was
daytime, and stringent probable cause-all of clear by the time Coolidge was decided. In Jones v.
which constitute "powerful and complementary
United States,9 the Court stated that "it is settled
protections for the privacy interests associated with doctrine that probable cause for belief that certain
the home." ' Further, White noted that these limi- articles subject to seizure are in a dwelling cannot
tations on warrantless arrest entries are satisfied on of itself justify search without a warrant. ' 'O This
the facts presented to the Court.
position finds support in the language of Justice
White also asserted that his rule would not ham- Jackson in Johnson v. United States:
per effective law enforcement, while the majority
When the right of privacy must reasonably yield to
rule was seriously flawed in this regard. Under the
the right of search is, as a rule, to be decided by a
majority rule, police officers will delay making
judicial officer, not by a policeman or government
arrests and will be faced with the difficult task of
enforcement agent. There are exceptional circumdetermining whether exigent circumstances exist. 95
stances in which, on balancing the need for effective
Further, the uncertainty inherent in the exigent
law enforcement against the right of privacy, it may
circumstances determination burdens the judicial
be contended that a magistrate's warrant for search
system as well. According to White, under the
may be dispensed with.1 'O
majority decision, whenever the police have made
a warrantless home arrest there will be the possi- Thus, a warrantless search is unreasonable absent
bility of endless litigation with respect to the exis- exigent circumstances or unless performed incident
tence of exigent circumstances.9
to a valid arrest. °2
90Id. at 1393. See note 80 supra.
97403 U.S. 443 (1971).
91See note 77 supra.
9 Id. at 477-80.
92100 S. Ct. at 1394 (White, J., dissenting).
99 357 U.S. 493 (1958).
93Id. at 1395.
9 id.
iSOId. at 497 (citing Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S.
95
Id. at 1396.
20, 33 (1925)).
101333 U.S. 10, 14-15 (1948).
9 Id. at 1397 (citing United States v. Watson, 423 U.S.
'02
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. at 474-75.
411 1975) ("whether it was practicable to get a warrant,
See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
whether the suspect was about to flee, and the like").
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The Court took an opposite stance in its decisions
on the reasonableness of warrantless arrests prior
to Payton. In Gerstein v. Pugh,0 3 the Court acknowledged that "while the Court has expressed a preference for the use of arrest warrants when feasible
...it has never invalidated an arrest supported by
probable cause solely because the officers failed to
secure a warrant."' 4 Moreover, in United States v.
Watson, 0 5 the Court upheld the daytime warrantless public arrest of a felony suspect by a postal
inspector
who was acting under statutory author°6
ity.1
Despite the Court's confirmation of the bifurcated treatment of searches and seizures in Watson,
neither that decision nor the Court's earlier fourth
amendment decisions dictate an opposing result in
Payton v. New York. Payton is a case of first impression,
since the Court reserved the issue of warrantless
arrests in the home in Watson. 10 7 In addition, the
Payton Court was able to draw upon the well-developed body of law concerning the privacy of the
homet 8 as well as its search and seizure decisions.
The Court failed to explain why warrantless
searches and warrantless arrests, which once demanded separate standards, should now be analyzed under the same rubric, except for its equation
of warrantless searches and home arrests on the
basis of their shared characteristic of invasion of
the private home. 0 9 Justice Stevens was not troubled by the Court's previous differential treatment
of searches and seizures. " Indeed, in Payton, Stevens stated simplistically that "searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable," relying on the Coolidge
103420 U.S. 103 (1975).
'04 Id. at 113 (citations omitted).
105423 U.S. at 416. The subsequent warrantless search
of Watson's car could not have been made absent a valid
arrest or consent of Watson.
0
1 6Id.at 418 n.6.
0
' 71d. at 415. Title 18 U.S.C. § 3061(a)(3) expressly
empowers the Board of Governors of the Postal Service
to authorize Postal Service Officers and employees to
make warrantless felony arrests if based on probable
cause. The statute is silent as to the question of warrantless entry. See note 80 supra.
'0s See 100 S. Ct. at 1381-82.
'0 Id. at 1381. "To be arrested in the home involves
not only the invasion attendant to all arrests but also an
invasion of the sanctity of the home." Id. (quoting United
States v. Reed, 572 F.2d 412, 423 (2d Cir. 1978)).
"o"The simple language of the Amendment applies
equally to seizures of persons and to seizures of property.
Our analysis in this case may therefore properly commence with rules that have been well established in
Fourth Amendment litigation involving tangible items."
100 S.Ct. at 1379.
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dicta for this assertion."' Nonetheless, the Court
attempted to fill this gap in its reasoning by relying
on Dorman v. United States and United States v. Reed
for the proposition that warrantless searches and2
seizures in the home are per se unreasonable."
The Court's position is further supported by its
concern for the privacy and sanctity of the home3
expressed in earlier fourth amendment decisions."
Perhaps the Court's recognition of individual privacy interests is an adequate basis to differentiate
Payton from prior decisions upholding warrantless
arrests outside the home. The majority, however,
can be criticized for characterizing the issue of
warrantless home arrests as "well-settled,""14 when
in fact only the Payton decision settled the issue.
Despite the failure to explain its reasoning, the
majority cannot be criticized for doing away with
the differential treatment of searches and seizures
of its earlier fourth amendment decisions. A judicial rule affording more protection to tangible
items in an individual's home than to the individual himself is plainly illogical. In Dorman, Judge
Leventhal aptly stated "an entry to arrest and an
entry to search for and to seize property implicate
the same interest in preserving the privacy and
sanctity of the home, and justify the same level of
constitutional protection."" 5
By recognizing the individual's interest in the
privacy of his home, therefore, the Court implicitly
balanced those interests with the government's interests in law enforcement in Payton. Central to the
holding prohibiting a warrantless and nonconsensual entry into a suspect's home for an arrest is the
determination that the individual's privacy interest
in his home outweighs the competing governmental interest in making arrests based on probable
cause. The District of Columbia Circuit's decision
in Dorman provides the mechanism for applying
this balancing test in the form of a set of factors to
determine the existence of exigent circumstances,
the exception to the rule. Indeed, the court has
recognized that there are situations where the government's need to proceed without a warrant outweighs the individual's privacy interest, as evidenced by the following statement from Johnson v.
..Id. at 1380.

2 Id. at 1380-81. See note 109 supra.
113 100 S. Ct. at 1382. "At the very core (of the fourth

amendment) stands the right of a man to retreat into his
own home and there be free from unreasonable Government intrusion." Id. (quoting Silverman v. United States,
365 U.S. 505, 511 (1965)).
114 Id. at 1381.
115 435 F.2d 385, 390 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
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UnitedStates: "There are exceptional circumstances officers to forcibly enter to make an arrest. Lord
in which, on balancing the need for effective law Coke believed that "neither the constable, nor any
enforcement against the right of privacy, it may be other can break open any house for the apprehencontended that a magistrate's warrant for a search sion of the party suspected or charged with the
may be dispensed with."'1 6 Furthermore, thiE felony....",,22 Blackstone, however, took an opmethod of weighing competing individual and gov- posite view:
ernmental interests provides a workable standard
The constable... hath great original and inherent
for the judiciary and law enforcement officials to
authority with regard to arrests. He may, without
determine when a warrant is necessary. Payton
warrant, arrest anyone for a breach of the peace
makes the Court's definition of "exigent circumcommitted in his view, and carry him before a
stances" in its decisions on the reasonableness of
justice of the peace. And in the case of felony
warrantless searches applicable to warrantless
actually committed, as a dangerous wounding,
home arrests. In future decisions, the Court may
whereby felony is like to ensue, he may upon probspecifically apply its fourth amendment search deable suspicion arrest the felon; and for that purpose
is authorized (as upon a justice's warrant) to break
cisions to cases involving warrantless home arrests.
open doors. .... 2
The principal ground for criticism of the majority
opinion is the inordinate amount of space devoted
Dalton' 2 and Hale1 25 concurred with Blackto a fruitless analysis of the common law. In an
126
127
attempt to distinguish Watson, Justice Stevens be- stone, as did Chitty and Stephen. The works
came embroiled in a dispute with Justice White as of Burn, Foster, and Hawkins are not free from
was required
to the nature and significance of the common law. ambiguity, but suggest that a warrant
to effect a valid home arrest1 2S East noted: "But
Justice Stevens concluded that the issue of the
validity of a warrantless home entry for the purpose though a felony have actually been committed, yet
of a felony arrest was not definitively settled by the a bare suspicion of guilt against the party will not
warrant proceeding to this extremity [breaking
common law, 1 7 yet he asserted that the common
law provided important considerations for dispos- doors], unless the officer be armed ' with a magising of the issue. 118 That an unsettled common law trate's warrant on such suspicion." -9 From these
commentaries Justice Stevens concluded that Lord
can shed light
on the issue in Payton is difficult to
19
Coke's view was authoritative, and the Framers
conceive.1
must have intended that a warrant was required
Justice Stevens' appraisal of the common law
30
White countered this conrelied on Semayne's Case for the proposition that "in to enter a residence
clusion
with
his
assertion
that the majority of
all cases when the King is a party, the Sheriff (if
commentators
would
permit
warrantless arrest enthe doors be not open) may break the party's house,
tries
if
based
on
probable
cause. According to
either to arrest him, or to do other execution of the
20
White,
such
entries
were
not
unreasonable
at comenter."'
cannot
he
otherwise
if
process,
131
King's
mon law.
Stevens characterized this passage as one which
"cannot be said unambiguously to endorse war1224 E. COKE, supra note 72, at * 177.
''
2
entries.
23 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 71.
rantless
'24M. DALTON, supra note 71.
There is sharp disagreement among common
12 1 M. HALE, supra note 71.
law commentators regarding the authority of peace
126 1 J. CHITTv, supra note 71.
116 333 U.S. at 14-15.
1274 H. STEPHEN, supra note 71.
17 100 S. Ct. at 1386.
1281 R. BURN, supra note 73, at 69 (1775); M. FOSTER,
118 "An examination of the common-law understandCROWN LAW 320-21 (1762); 2 W. HAWKINS, supra note
ing of an officer's authority to arrest sheds light on the 73, at 138-39.
obviously relevant, if not entirely dispositive, considera129 1 E. EAST, supra note 73, at 322. See also 1 W.
tion of what the Framers of the Amendment might have RUSSELL, supra note 73.
thought to be reasonable." Id. at 1382-83.
130 100 S. Ct. at 1385.
"9 See Note, supra note 70, which reveals that "examiIt is obvious that the common-law rule on warrantnation of the major common-law commentaries reveals,
less arrests was not as clear as the rule on arrests in
however, that there has been no definitive rule on the
public places. Indeed, particularly considering the
subject;" and concludes "the common law therefore does
prominence of Lord Coke, the weight of authority
not indicate the Framers' view of the constitutionality of
as it appeared to the Framers was to the effect that
a warrantless home arrest."
a warrant was required ....
1205 Co. Rep. 91a, 91b, 77 Eng. Rep. 194, 195 (K.B.
"'Id. at 1391-92 (White, J., dissenting). "Probably
the majority of commentators would permit arrest entries
1603).
121 100 S. Ct. at 1383.
on probable suspicion even if the person arrested were
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Hence the Justices engaged in an unprofitable
battle of experts on the common law. In his dissent,
Justice White relied on the concept of the inherent
power of the peace officer to arrest and search at
common law, which power was unaffected by the
fourth amendment. 32 Probably the most illuminating observation throughout this exercise was
that of Justice Stevens that "our study of the
relevant common law does not provide
33 the same
guidance that was present in Watson."'
CONCLUSION

Payton v. New York is a watershed in the Court's
search and seizure decisions. The holding eliminates the illogical bifurcated treatment of warrantless searches and arrests, which had the effect
of according the individual's property greater protection than the individual. More importantly,
Payton provides a mechanism for balancing the
competing interests of government and the individual, taking into account those exigent circumstances which would justify a warrantless home
arrest.
not in fact guilty .... It was not generally considered
"unreasonable" at common law for officers to break down
doors
32 in making warrantless felony arrests." Id.

Id. at 1392.
13 Id. at 1386 (opinion of the majority).
1

The alternative rule espoused by Justice White,
by contrast, provides no protection for individual
privacy. Indeed, Justice White's rule is a potentially dangerous tactical weapon for the unscrupulous law enforcement official. Justice White contended that his four restrictions of entry only for a
felony arrest, knock and announce, daylight entry,
and stringent probable cause would more than
adequately protect individual privacy. The thrust
of the fourth amendment's protections of individual privacy is not, however, the individual who
"surrender[s] at his front door, thereby maintaining
his dignity."'1' By his lack of cooperation, the
individual who attempts to flee or hide gives the
police officer permission to follow under Justice
White's rule." Hence this rule allows the police
officer to manufacture circumstances which shall
be deemed exigent for purposes ofwarrantless entry
and arrest. Under the majority rule in Payton, however, the government may enter the individual's
home to arrest him only with a warrant or where
exigent circumstances demand entry. The police
can neither determine probable cause nor create
exigent circumstances.
DENISE P. GARVEY

13 Id. at 1395-96 (White, J., dissenting).
3
' 5 Id. at 1396 n.14.

